genuine question for the confidential compute people 🙏 if the attestation is signed by the same vendor who makes the chip then who is the trust anchor here 😅 not saying its bad im just trying to understand where the root actually sits
The root is the vendor, full stop. What you buy is a move from trusting the operator to trusting the manufacturer. That is a large improvement if your threat model is a rogue tenant or a curious sysadmin, and no improvement whatsoever if it is the manufacturer's own legal department.
就是换个对象信而已 别包装成不需要信任
the more useful question is what happens when the signing key rotates and your archived quotes stop verifying. nobody in this space has a good answer for that and it will bite someone in audit
ok this is genuinely helpful 🙌 so its trust relocation not trust removal and the key rotation thing is the part i should actually be worried about 🫶
